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Introduction
The title of this paper was chosen both for pedagogic and for rhetorical
reasons. On the face of it, the title makes little sense. For "everyone knows"
that the three great neoclassical economists were Jevons, Menger and Waliras.
Their joint contribution was the development of marginal analysis. Walras
specifically emphasized general equilibrium analysis. Marshall synthesized
the new econoiid.cs, or neoclassical economics, with the insights of Ricardian
orthodoxy, and developed a new orthodox that reigned in the Anglo-Saxon
world until the thirties, when Hicks and Alien reintroduced Walraslan and
Paretian ideas. The Lausanne School*s approach made it a more convenient
framework in which to formalize economic theory, and to ei!q)hasize the general
Interconnectedness of all economic events. Meanwhile, the distinctively
Austrian contribution was to apply the marginal analysis and subjective value
theory to capital theory.^ While professional historians of thought are
2
generally i!K)re circumspect about the homogeneity of Jevons, Menger and Walras,
nonspecialists in the history of economics tf^t their work as Homogeneous wi'th-
out scruples. In this framework that sees a unified contribution — a new
orthodoxy — my question indeed makes no sense.
The purpose of this paper is to challenge the prevailing view of the recent
history of economics, and, specifically, to consider Menger's distinctive
contribution. It is necessary to do the former, in order to establish that
Jfenger did have a distinctive contribution to make! In developing what I see
as Menger*s distinctive contribution, I will consider some recent interpretations
Finally, I will consider the in^>ortance and relevance of Menger*8 ideas for
conten^orary economics.
-2-
Economics Trivialized
The problem with viewing the three great neoclassical economists, and
their followers, as having independently developed an essentially homogeneous
theory—a new orthodoxy—has been put but by Professor Leijonhufvud:
The conceptual differences between the great 'neoclassical*
system-builders remain of considerable interest and significance
to us here and now. Their 'common denominator/ on the other
hand, has with time become uninteresting and an obstacle to clear
thought. The common denominator goes under the label of the
*Marginalist Revolution'—portrayed as the simultaneous discovery
of the first derivative of practically everthing (followed, after
decades of hard 'neoclassical* work, in due course by the discovery
of the second derivative of absolutely everything). This is a
conception of the work of the 'neoclassical' giants that
irreparibly trivializes their contributions in the eyes of a
calculus-trained student generation.^
Ricardo clearly had the concept of the margin. If neoclassical
economics' only claim to fame is borrowing the calculus, and generalizing
the concept of the margin, then it is very much the sterile enterprise that
its severest critics have claimed it to be. Por as neoclassical marginalism
developed, many of the concerns of classical political economy became of
diminished inq)ortance« I am thinking of classical political econon^r's
attention to economic development and capital accumulation, not to mention
Smith's emphasis on the division of labor.^ The wonders of marginalism are
great indeed. But its intellectual dominance has not been an unmixed blessing.
For marginalism, or modern neoclassical economics is an obstalce to thinking
about problens of change over time, such as economic growth; and, in general,
it handles discontinuities not well at all. All of this was the forte of
classical political economy. Moreover, as Leijonhufvud quite correctly notes,
the view of neoclassical economics as applied marginalism trivializes the
contributions of its early developers.
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I am in effect arguing that economists are prisoners of their own percep
tion. . They genuinely believe that^neoclassical economics is nothing but the
general application of marginal principles. They consequently view the early
6
neoclassical economists as having first proposed this view of economics*
Conten^orary economists will proba.bly not reassess their views of their
neoclassical forefathers until they reconsider their view of economics today.
But their view of their ancestors reinforces t:heir proclivity to rampant
marginalism. ^ We have 3 glear case here of the inexti^lcable link between
contemporary economic problems and the history of economics.
My task has been Itiade immensely easier due to a^recent article-'by Professor
William Jaffd.® Jaffd has dealt adiidrably with our general problem: the
definition of the neoclassical revolution. Jaff^ at first parallels
Leijonhufvud;
The question I propose to raise here is not whether there ever was
a *Marginal Revolution' in the proper sense of the term, but
whether the use of any single appelation to designate the three
'revolutionary' innovations of the 1870's obscures precisely those
differences between them which the passage of time has revealed
more ii]q)ortant than anything they might have had in common,®
While doing so does not do justice to Jaffa's treatment, I will juxtapose
some of his.observations about the distinctive contributions of Jevons, Menger
and Walras. Of Walras, Jaff^ notes; "It cannot be emphasized enough that
what L^on Walras was after was the completion of his competitive market model,
and not the elaboration of a theory of subjective valuation in consumption."^^
Walras showed "an inattention to consumption" because, in Jaffa's words: "His
pure theory was a catallactic theory of the determination of prices under a
hypothetical regime of perfectly free coupetition; and it was strictly in that
context that Walras invoked marginal utility." As Jafffi then notes" "what
a far cry this was from the central concerns of Jevons or Menger.
-4-
The differences are apparent: "In Jevons, per contra, there is no analysxs
of the operations of the market mechanism by which his *consequent ratio of
exchange* is arrived at."^^ And further: "Not only was Jevons' approach
entirely different from that of Walras, but his point of departure also. Jevons
13
started out from Bentham*s felicific calculus..."
While I will consider various recent views of Menger in detail, Jaffa's
Included, symmetry dictates that at least note one distinctive feature of
Manger's theory noted by Jaffg: Menger believed research should be directed
toward "imderlying elementary causes of economic phenomena in all their manifold
complexity." In this, Menger was an essentialist.^^ And, in Jaffa's words:
"For the performance of this task \riiat is required is hot the mathematical
method, but a method of process analysis tracing the complex phenomena of the
social econoiny to the underlying atomistic forces at work. He called it the
'analytic-coii5)ositive method*.
Robert Eagly completed his recent book. The Structure of Classical Economic
Theorywith a brilliant chapter on the connection between classical political
economy and Walras' system of general equilibrium analysis. He saw Walras
system as both the capstone of classical analysis, and the cornerstone of a new
orthodoxy.Using Jaffa's insights, one can anmiend Eagly by observing that
Walras' catallactics perfected the classical theory of markets. On the other
hand, Walras' theory replaced the causal, sequential analysis of classical
political economy with the concept of mutual determination of all quantities.
The perfection of the classical system became its replacement as a new research
program developed.
But one can now speculate in what manner Jevons' system can be viewed as
capstone and cornerstone. Jevons took Bentham's calculus of pain and pleasure,
and applied it to the theory of optimization. In doing so, he "bestowed
concentrated effort on an atteii5)t to reduce utilitarian speculations to an
-5-
exact science which would be useful as a foundation for the theory of value
In exchange."^® But In doing so, Jevons replaced the classical theory of
19
value,
What remains to be shown is Anger's place in the evolution of economic
thought. To so place Mehger is my chief desideratum, and the problem to
which I now turn.
>fenger Reconsidered
Recent Interpretations
Several recent interpretations have already en^hasized the uniqueness of
Menger's contribution. While Jaffa's paper dealt with a more general problem,
it raised a number of the issues that need to be addressed in a reappraisal
of ^nger. Inter alia, they include the question of whether to view the
economic system in a general equilibrium framework, so that the technique of
mutual determination of variables is most appropriate, or whether to think in
cause and effect terms, so that process analysis is appropriate. In two
comparatively recent papers. Professor Streissler, the current holder of
Menger*s chair in Vienna, has offered a radical reinterpretation of^nger's
20
work. In the more recent essay, Streissler examines Menger*s monetary theory.
Here the ground is more familiar to historians of thought, and Streissler's
21
interpretation is less controversial. Streissler succinctly states his
interpretation of Menger's approach to monetary theory as follows:
Evidently, Menger tried to create a brand of iK)netary theory
under uncertainty, basically a disequilibrium theory of money. How
does this fit in with the idea of Menger as the originator of one
of the three marginalist schools, as one of the three shcools of
microeconomic equilibrium theory based on maximizing behavior? It
does not fit in, because this idea, which stems mainly from an
eclectic perusal of the works of his successors, is wrong in
-6-
itself. It is a well-known fact that Menger did not believe in the
idea of equilibrium, that he held with Aristotle that no such state
as equilibrium exists in human lives. He did not believe in-
equilibrium as an adequate description of the conditions ruling in
any aggregate of human relationships. Instead, he pictured society
as in constant flex, subject to changes which could not even be
described as moving equilibria. And he did not believe even
the economic individual easily achieved full equilibrium.
Ifenger developed his theory of money as part of his general theory of
commodity holding (i.e., his analysis of stock-demand). Integral to this
analysis is an eii?)hasis on the demand for liquidity in commodities, and on
commodities as buffer stocks. Thus, Streissler observes that "[tfenger] does
not envisage money as something whose value is precisely planned but much
23
rather as a buffer stock against the non-fulfillment of plans."
This picture of Jfenger's iKjnetary theory is consistent with that
recently presented by,Hicks. Moreover, it is the one part of Menger's
economics that has received some attention from,economic theorists, mainly
because of the general dissatisfaction with contemporary monetary theory.
Streissler goes on, however, to connect Menger*s theory to his theory of
market evolution, in which Menger pictures this evolution as one from isolated
exchange ("monopoly.. .in the widest sense"^^) to competition, with the later a
rare occurrence in its pure form. tfenger's vision of markets is perhaps
near the opposite end on a spectrum from Jevons*; price dispersion is
ubiquitous. A highly liquid commodity is required to take advantage of price
dispersion, or in order to make a "bargain," as Streissler puts it.^"
Yet one has questions even about Streissler*s interpretation of Menger*s
monetary economics. First, Streissler adapts a procedure that is fraught
with danger. He attempts to picture Menger as modem by emphasizing the
similarities with twentieth century monetary thought. There is always the
danger that the historian will fit earlier thinkers into a Procrustean bed.
-7-
There Is some of this in Strelssler*s analysis. Thus, he argues that: "It
is largely forgotten nowadays that in questions of monetary theory Menger
anticipated most of J. M. Keynes' ideas. Or, to be more precise, he had moved
in the same direction as Keynes, long before Keynes, but much more decisively
and radically.He then restates Menger*s analysis in the Keyhesian
28 I
terminology of precautionary and speculative balances. Next, Menger s
analysis is fitted into Hicks* "Flex-Price and Fix-Price" model.But what is even
more objectionable, Streissler uses Menger to support the Streissler theory, and
especially to attack the neo-quantity theorists la Friedman) on the question
of a stable demand for money, by beating them over the head with Menger's
ideas, as presented by Streissler.^® In doing so, I believe Streissler has
gone beyond arguing similarities between Menger and modem thinkers (especially
Keynes) to forcing Menger into a framework that was not really his own. This
is especially ironic, since Streissler*s objections to interpretations of
^nger "as the originator of one of the three marginalist schools...of
microeconomic equilibrium theory based on maximizing behavior" parallels my
objections to what Streissler has done.
(
What is especially objectionable about Streissler*s procedure is his
tendency to make broad statements of interpretation with insufficient
references to the text. This tendency is even more marked in Streissler's
more general interpretative essay on Menger, which was presented at the 1971
Bellagio meetings on the Marginal Revolution. It is to this other essay
that I now turn. In this paper, Streissler asks essentially the question that
I am asking: "To What Extent Was the Austrian School Marginalist?"^^ He
reduces this to the question of Menger*s marginalism by arguing that "Menger...
had the status, the institutional position to enforce at least initial concurrence
with his opinions and thus become the pivot on whom the school turned.He
then observes that "the further his pupils escaped [Menger], the more
-8-
marglnallst they become, precisely because they escaped him, precisely because
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they assimilated other traditions. While Streissler*s procedure here strikes
me as question-begging, if he really wants to address the question of the
marginalism of the Austrian School, my interest is in Menger, too. So I will
go to his substantive argument about Menger*s economic ideas, particularly
those in the GrundsStze. Streissler's thesis is stated as follows:
Henger^s book is a conscious complement to Adam Smithes
Wealth of Nations and for this reason it is not static, but concerned
with economic progress. It is intended to elucidate the change in
the range and in the quality of goods. It is an investigation of
the restraints of economic action, or rather the change of the
restraints through a change in the choice variables (and not
primarily an investigation of the objective function in economics),
to such an extent that Menger thought it necessary to stress this
aspect as the sole object of economic theorizing. And it is, above
all, basically an Information theory, economic theory under
uncertainty and not under certainty. Because of these aspects the
Austrians always stressed, and stressed rightly, I think, that
they were the school of subjective value, a school apart.
Streissler classifies his remarks three pages later by observing that
"...Menger*s GrundsStze was an attenQ)t to sketch a theory of economic develop-
36ment." Streissler sees Menger*s "central thesis" as stated early in the first
chapter of the GrundsStze:
It is not so much the division of labor, that is to say, a feature
of the productive process, that Increases welfare, but the constant
widening of the range of goods and the improvement of their quality,
i.e., changes in the productive output. Even the division of labor
itself is a consequence of the increase in the range of commodities,
which makes it all the more 'necessary and economic.* This is
Mengerian 'technical progress,' the change of commodities (and,
in a narrower sense, also of wants), product innovation, to be
contrasted with Marxian 'technical progress' (that full development
of classical ideas), the process innovation of an emmitable
product. It is thus in the true tradition of Menger that Schusq^eter's
treatment of technical progress is so much more inclusive than
Marxian or modern neoclassical treatment. Notice, furthermore,
that Menger usually speaks of the 'quality and quantity' of goods
and disciisses quality in extenso in two long paragraphs. Even this
first statement thus shows that Mengerian goods are three-
dimensional: they have quantity, quality, and variety as separate
dimensions of dynamic change;37
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It is difficult to know what to make of these series of truly remarkable
statements by Streissler. For I don't find tfenger even talking about the
subject that Streissler claims Menger is addressing in this section. Still
less do 1 see the basis for Streissler's assertation that the "whole
38programmatic exposition leads" to this section. It is true that Menger
talks about "the widening of the range of goods," but in terms of increasing
39the output of capital goods ("goods of third, fourth, and higher orders" ).
He is criticizing Adam Smith for placing too much emphasis on the division
of labor, and he does so by showing how the accumulation of capital is
ultimately connected with this process. Only at one point, and this apparently
in passing, does Menger allude to changes in the quality or type of consumption
40
output produced. The rest of the section is concerned with the effects of
41capital accumulation, a process which it is odd to call "product innovation."
Since Streissler rightly en^hasizes Menger*s concern with time and capital,
42it is certainly odd that he apparently misread this section.
More generally, we have no reason to accept an argument about what Menger
"really" wanted to do. He unquestionably talked about economic development, as
both my citations and Strelssler's attest. But noting how often an author
addresses a subject does not go to prove that this was the only or chief area
of that author's interest, especially if one fails to note how frequently the
author is not addressing the subject in question. It is quite true that:
"Again and again Menger stresses the time dimension of goods and the amount of
43uncertainty this entails." Likewise, I agree with Streissler that: "The
stress on informational content is one of the respects in which Ifenger
44
was very modem. And so on. But Menger, like his fellow neoclassical
economists, did address the value problem, and did so in the static framework
that is almost inevitable in dealing with this subject. I might add that the
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chapter In which he did so, "the Theory of Value," is the longest one in the
book,^^ The emphasis on the subject does not provide sufficient grounds to
homogenize the neoclassicals, as in the standard interpretation that Jaff€,
Leijonhufvud and others have rejected. But rejecting this interpretation is
surely not & sufficient^reason to move ari element of. the Sook tOt center stage.
In countering an erroneous interpretation, one does a disservice in presenting
an essentially bizarre interpretation.
Steissler's interpretation of Menger*s goal in the Grundsatze is bizarre
because, if we are to take Streissler literally, he is arguing that Menger
pursued the very goal there that he decried twelve years later in his attack
on the German Historical School! Menger noted there that "there is not a
phenomenon of the real world which does not offer us the spectacle of constant
46change." But, unlike Streissler, Menger himself distinguished carefully
between this proposition, and the one that economics could be conceived of as
the theory of economic development:
Now the so-called 'development' of things constitutes in fact
only a small portion of their changes in time, for we usually
understand by 'developn^nt' only those changes which result from
the characteristic nature of things, and in the case of which,
accordingly, a particular individuality remains preserved in spite
of change in time. We therefore do not speak of 'developments' of
those things which esdiibit no characteristic individuality. Nor
do we do so in those cases where a thing, of whatever type it be,
undergoes a change merely through external or chance circumstances.^^
It was Menger's very belief in the constantly changing character of the
world that led him to question the feasibility of a genuine theory of economic
development. While Streissler notes "Menger's constant stress on problems of
48information," he fails to note how inimical is Menger's approach to a theory
of economic developn^nt. Menger had even harsher words for this conception of
economics: "Thus the conception of theoretical economics, or even of political
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economy, as a science of the 'parallelisms of economic history,* of the 'laws
49of development in economy,' and other such things, is a one-sided monstrosity."
As for the .question of whether Menger's GrundsMtze "is a conscious complement
to Adam Smith's Wealth of Nationsone must, consider Menger's harsh judgment of
those who atteliqjt to establish "laws of development." Of this, ^nger observed,
that: ^
What an. unhistorical idea it is to coiiq>are the economic history of
all nations and times—not to state, for instance, the particularity
of individual developments, but their often extremely imperfect
parallelisms. What m 'unhistorical' notion, especially, to abstract
from the particularity and the inner connection of concrete economic
developments and institution in order to determine external
parallelisms of development.^^
For Menger, those who see in economics solely a theory of development conflate
theory and history. They fail to note the fundamental division of knowledge
in economics that Menger emphasized.
...In the field of economy we encounter individual and general
knowledge, and correspondingly sciences of the individual aspect
of phenomena and sciences of the general aspect. To the former
belong history and statistics of the economy, to the later theoreti
cal econoid.es; for the first two have the task of investigating
the-Individual economic phenomena, even if from different points of
view. The latter have the task of investigating the empirical
forms and laws (the general nature and general connection) of
economic phenomena.51
To seek a theory of development is to seek what history, not theory,
provides. To seek a theory of development is to make the opposite error of
the historicists, who sought to theorize by doing history. For Menger, the
two endeavors must be kept distinct. The Wealth of Nations has been pictured,
correctly I believe, as, inter alia, presenting a theory of economic development.
Indeed, even a general theory of laws of development or history (especially in
Book III). In this sense, Menger's Principles is not a complement but a virtual
attack on the Wealth of Nations.
-12-
A Relnterpretatlon
By now the reader may be impatient for the author's own Interpretation.
But the apparent detour through recent Interpretations—a roundabout process—
serves two very in^ortant functions. First, it establishes that scholars are
beginning to accept the heterogeneity of the work of the three original
"marginallsts." This acceptance opens the way for a reconsideration of Menger's
work. The Austrlans, and Menger in particular, can no longer be treated as
4
having been absorbed in the twentieth century orthodoxy. They have, in fact,
some claim to being the longest lived independent shcool of economics, Marxism
being more properly thought of as a metaphysical system, or general theory of
society. Second, this section serves partly to relate certain recent reinter-
pretations that, in the author's opinion, do not do justice to Menger, and
which perhaps go too far toward separating him from his contemporaries. And, of
course, in arguing what ^nger was not up to, X have at least moved closer to a
positive interpretation.
In his methodological work, ^nger presented his views on what constitutes
the research program in economics. In the absence of convincing evidence to the
contrary, one should assume that he held his own work on economics to the
standards that he proposed for others'. "Political economy," Menger wrote,
"(in its meaning which comprises theoretical economics, economic policy, and
53the science of finance) is a theoretical-practical science." A general
treatise on economics would be expected to deal with all these areas of
economics. Though it is apparently sometimes forgotten by historians of
s
thought when they are making invidious cougarisons among Menger, Jevons and
Walras, the Principles as we have it is only the first of a projected three
additional volumes. The first volume, which we have in finished form, treats
in its chapters the following topics:
-13-
1. The General Theory of the Good;
2. Econony and Economic Goods;
3. The Theory of Value;
4. The Theory of Exchange;
5. The Theory of Price;
6. Use Value ^d Exchange Value; ' •
7. The Theory of the Cpnmiodity;
8. The Theory of Money.
54There are also ten Appendices.
We are told that the second part was to deal with "'interest, wages,
rent, income, credit and paper money'"; the third part, the theory of production
and commerce, and economic reform in the fourth part.^^ Menger very much
appeared ready to follow the strictures that he laid down in Problems. He
wished to author a general treatise on politick econonQr. In doing so, Menger
would be building on classical political economy in at least two significant
respects. His treatise would evidently.follow the general contents of the
treatise on political econoioy by classical political economists. And his
treatise would build on their work.^^ But at least in his subjective theory
of value, Menger's work would be the cornerstone of a new theoretical edifice,
Thus, in the first part, the only published part, he attended carefully to the
C Q
theory of value, the theory of exchange and the theory of price.
We can now appreciate both the similarity and the differences between
Menger and his contemporary "marginalists." One thing above all that was shared
by Jevons, Menger and Walras was a commitment to microeconomic reasoning, over
the macroeconomic thing of classical, particularly Ricardian political economy,,
One sees this in J, S, Mill's treatment of the topics in his Principles of
Political Econony. Book I, "Production" is carried out in aggregative terms,
as is Book II, "Distribution," Book III, "Exchange," presents Ricardian value theory,
which, in the long run, is generally dependent costs of production, and thus on
the laws of production developed in Book I. Book IV is oil the "Influence of
the Progress of Society on Production and Distribution," while Book V is "On the
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Influence of Government," especially on its macro-public finance influence.
The works of Jevons, Menger and Walras each represent a radical break with the
macro tradition in economic theory.
Prom each of the three original neoclassical economists, we have a compre
hensive theory of market exchange built up from the theory of individual behavior,
and individual valuation. This approach is made explicit in Jevons when he
asserted that "human wants are the ultimate subject matter of economics.
Jevons correctly noted that this conception ran directly counter to the concep
tion of Ricardian, classical political econony; indeed, Jevons quoted J. S.
62Mill in opposition to this very idea. Menger is even more associated with the
consistent application of methodological individualism. As Hayek noted of
Menger*s methodological treatise, Untersuchungen Uber die Methode der
Socialwissenschaften und der Politischen Oekonomie insbesondere (translated as
Problems of Economics and Sociology):
Of the central contentions of the book one may be singled out
for further comment; his emphasis on the necessity of a strictly
individualistic or, as he generally says, atomistic method of
analysis... what with the classical economists had remained something
of a mixture between an ethical postulate and a methodological
tool, was developed by him systematically in the latter direction.
The coimnon element that was decisively shared by Jevons, Ifenger and Walras
was a commitment to methodological individualism and microeconomlc reasoning.
They were chary of dealing with those questions Inherited from classical
economics that seen^d inherently macroeconomic. And when they did deal with
those questions, they generally attempted to do so within a microeconomlc and
methodologically individualistic framework. Nowhere can this be seen more
readily than in tfenger*s work. It is not merely that he provided microeconomlc *
foundations for monetary theory. He developed a microeconomlc theory of money.
There is no feature of his monetary theory that resembles the macroeconomic
-15-
features of modern monetary theory. He was concerned with the role of nu^ney
In decision-making, a role that he saw to be significant, Indeed. For he saw
all decisions as Involving uncertainty. And money was a means, evolved In
the market, with which to lessen the costs of uncertain decision-making.
For Menger, money Is liquidity. And liquidity diminishes the costs associated
with uncertainty. Even "macroeconomlc" applications are pursued with strictly
64
mlcroeconomlc and disaggregated analysis.
Moreover, while we find a distinct similarity in the broad approach of the
three great founders of modern marginal utility and neoclassical economic theory,
there were distinct and probably irreconcilable differences among them. I
will return to some of these in the next section. But be it noted here that
two factors thus made it inevitable that modern economics can be called
"neoclassical" in only a tortured sense. Once a research program, on which there
is only general agreement as to approach, is implemented the differences that
separate schools are botind to become more Important. To pretend there is
homogeneity where there is not only insures that problems will not be addressed,
because they will not be perceived as problems. "We all agree, surely" becomes
65 'the accepted intellectual position.
The common element in the Marginal Revolution was a mlcroeconomlc revolu
tion against the Rlcardlan macroeconomlc approach to economic questions. The
differences in what was essentially a tripartite revolution were significant.
As Mark Blaug has noted, the Marginal Revolution took three distinctive forms:
"the marginal utility revolution in England and America, the subjectlvlst
revolution in Austria, and the general equilibrium revolution in Switzerland
and Italy." And as I have argued above, the general similarity among the
revolutions gave some basis initially for speaking of "the Marginal Revolution."
Yet the very differences alone could have been es^ected to make it less fruitful
-16-
over time to speak of "marginalism" or "neoclassical economics" as a consistent
approach, unless, in reality—as is true—one shcool's views become dominent.^^
All this is true, but I now wish to focus on another factor that makes it
6ftdubious to call Menger a "neoclassical economist."
Particularly in Anglo-Saxon economics, neoclassical economics developed as
a horrible brew, in which marginal utility theory was merged with Ricardian
political economics. Alfred Marshall is largely responsible for this. He was
quite open about saving what he could of classical theory. But in so doing,
tfarshall became largely responsible for the division between microeconomics
and macroeconomics, a division that I do not see either Menger or Jevons
recognizing.
Further, Sir John Hicks succeeded in formalizing this division. Being
largely responsible for bringing Paretian and Walrasian modes of analysis to the
attention of the profession. Sir John at the sane time developed the foundations
of "neoclassical" macrotheory. To avoid doctrinal disputes we will call this
macrotheory "Hicksian," though clearly many still see it as Keynesian, Yet
in so doing, he fimdamentally altered the course of neoclassical economics.
Neoclassical economics today draws its microeconomics largely from Walras,
but it is not Walrasian. It is not because it is (an inconsistent, I believe)
mixture of a genuine neoclassical (or Walrasian) approach, and the approach of
Ricardian political economy. Whatever the commonality in the work of Menger,
Walras and Jevons—and I do think there was some—no one can legitimately argue
that Menger in particular would find current economic thinking congenial.
It would singly look too much like the macroeconomic thinking that he consciously
rejected in his work.
Viewed as a general microeconomic revolution, the Marginal Revolution
was never coiqileted. As the result of Marshall's retreat, and Hicks* synthesis,
large areas of economics were effectively ceded to an older way of thinking.
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Whlle economists generally accept this division as somehow natural, I do not
believe an examination of the relevant history of economic thought would support
this belief. In any case, the acceptance of a macro realm of thinking in economics
surely goes against the original neoclassical spirit, the spirit that co\mts for
whatever homogeneity exists in the work of the three figures with whom I have
been concerned. I suppose, then, that I am arguing that it is modern economists
who are not "neoclassical." But if one accepts the soleistic usage of "neo
classical," then Carl Menger most assuredly was not a neoclassical economist.
The Mengerian Contribution
I have argued that that which bound the early neoclassical or marginalist
economists together was a commitment to methodological Individualism and a
concern for microeconomic as opposed to macroeconomic theory. The specifically
(tengerian, and, indeed, Austrian contribution to economic theory is its
methodological subjectivism. Writers have frequently noted that Menger, in
particular, was concerned with disequilibrium economics, rather than the pure
theory of equilibrium states that so occupied Jevons, andj to an even greater
extent, Walras.^^ But the connection between Menger's subjectivism and his
eiiq>hasis on change and the economic process—a constant state of disequilibrium—
is not generally made,^^ Yet one will inevitably be lead to reject analysis
of equilibrium states as the central concern of economic theory once one
adopts methodological subjectivism* For subjectivism leads one to analyze
all economic events in terms of the perceptions of human actors. A thing is a
good because individuals believe it to be a good. Decisions are made because
of individuals' beliefs about the relevant state of the world, not because of
the actual or objective state of the world as seen by an ideal observor, such
as the economist qua modeler • In a very real sense, the data of the economic
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system are subjective. If one believes, as did Menger, that "there is not a
phenomenon of the real world which does not offer us the spectacle of constant
72change," then it would be absurd ever to deal with perfect knowledge
constructs. The assumption of perfect knowledge is a profoundly anti-^sub.lectlvist
assumption. This fact alone explains why Austrian economists have steadfastly
refused to "fall into line" with the modern neoclassical.school, and have
obstinately considered themselves a school apart, tforeover, since perfect
knowledge, as Hayek demonstrated, is the defining characteristic of equilibrium,
an economics in which uncertainty is central is. inherently an economics of
disequilibrium, of the market process and of change.
Nowhere else can this be seen better than in Menger *s own treatment of
a good. Menger states that:
If a thing is to become a good, or in other words, if it is
to acquire goods-character, all four of the following prerequisites
must be simultaneously present:
1. A human need. I
2. Such properties as render the thing capable of being
brought into a causal connection with the satisfaction
of this need. '
3. Human knowledge of this causal connection.
4. Command of the thing sufficient to direct it to the
satisfaction of the need.^^
This leads tfenger to treat, inter alia, the "special situation" in which:
)
"attributes, and therefore capacities, are erroneously ascribed to things that
do not really possess them or...when nonexistent human needs are mistakenly
74assumed to exist." In the first class, Menger lists such things as cosmetics,
diving rods and love potions. In the second class, he lists such things as
medicines for none^stent diseases and pagan idols. And he states that "such
things, therefore, as derive their goods-character merely from properties
they are imagined to possess or from needs merely imagined by men may appropriately
be called Imaginary goods.
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Menger consistently followed a methodology of subjectivism. For instance,
in speaking of Menger*s theory of money, to which we have already alluded,
Hayek observed that "the main Austrian achievement in this field is the
consistent application to the theory of money of the peculiar subjective or
individxialistic approach which, indeed underlies the marginal utility analysis,
but which has a much wider and more universal significance,"^^
Once-again, one is often confronted with the spurious claim that the
Austrians' special emphasis on subjectivism has been incorporated into modern
neoclassical thinking. "After all, tastes are subjective." Or, "demand is
the subjective element in price determination, while cost is the objective
element." This opinion might be attributed to a modified variant of the
"homogeneity hypothesis," i.e., the hypothesis that the works of Jevons, Menger
and Walras are essentially homogeneous. This modified view sees each of the
above as en^hasizing a particular aspect of marginalism. Modern economics has
judiciously weighed these various degrees of emphasis, and correctly apportioned
77the various factors, such as subjectivism. This view, which most assuredly
can be traced back to Marshall, is wrong headed from the point of view of the
Atistrians.
The view that subjectivism applies only to tastes, or the demand side of
price determination, evidences a fundamental misunderstanding of that for which
the Austrians were arguing. Let us consider the very case with which Marshall
was dealing. I will quote Wieser, who in many ways does not strike me as a
consistent methodological subjectivist, but who on opportxinity costs was quite
clear.
Between costs and utility there is no fundamental opposition.
Costs are goods valued, in the individual case, according to their
general utility. The opposition between costs and utility is only
that between the utility of the individual case, and utility on the
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whole. Whoever thinks of 'utility* without thinking of 'cost,*
singly neglects, in the utility of one production, the utility
of the others. And whoever produces, in the Individual case, at
least cost, produces, on the whole, with the highest utility.
Inasmuch as he thus saves all the opportunity of utility possible,
and consequently in the long run utilizes all the opporttmities
to the utmost possible.
Thus when the law of costs obtains, utility remains the source
of value. . More than this, marginal utility remains, the measure of
al e.I
Wieser is even clearer two pages later when he remarks that: *'Possibly
it is the greatest triim^h of the theory of marginal utility that it fi41y
explains the obscure conception of costs, with which every other theory had to
79reckon, and yd.th which no theory could come to any reckoning.*' I doubt that
very many modern theorists would so characterize marginal utility theory. This i
j
is imdoubtedly because in so far as they are acquainted with the primary sources, ,
economists have read the non-Austrians. In so far as they have read the ^
Austrians, they have done so through rose-colored glasses.
Marshall is certainly guilty of the latter in his famous scissors '
analogy. In that analogy, he was critical of the Austrians for treating utility
alone as the source of value, or explanation of price. This, Marshall thought,
placed too much eii5)hasis on the demand side. No one else has dealt with
Marshall more effectively than Joseph Schumpeter:
They [the Austrians] stood in no need of being told about the two
blades of Itorshall's pair of scissors. What they aimed at showing
was that both blades consist of the saii« material—that both demmd
supply (no matter whether the case is one of exchanging existing
commodities or of producing them) may be explained in terms of
"utility.'SO
And, in a footnote that begins on the previous page, Schumpeter observed that:
...The marginal utility principle applies to the demand and supply
sides of the value problem In any case, both In the long run and
in the short rtin. Cost of production is not an independent
principle taking charge in the long run. But the marginal utility
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prlnclple, acting upon the data of the situation, will In the long
run (grating a number of assun^tlons) so operate as to equate
exchange value to costs.^l
Nor have modem neo-Walraslan, or neoclassical economists attained any
firmer grasp of the Austrian point. This confusion appears, Ironically, in an
article by Professors Arrow and Starrett in the volume honoring Carl Menger on
82
the centenary of the publication of the Grundsatze. For they apparently
conceive the problem of adjudicating between the classical and marginallst
theories of value as deciding between demand and cost theories of price. The
tacit assuiiq}tlon of their article is that utility determines demand, while an
Independent principle determines cost. Thus, a cost of production theory is one
in which "prices are determined solely by the technological conditions of
83
production." Arrow and Starrett address the problem with the classical
conception of costs. Yet, as Wleser pointed out, the "law of costs," or a
cost theory of value is a utility theory of value. That which separates the
Austrlans wd modern neoclassical economists on this issue, or in economics in
general, could not be more forcefully put. It is a question- of a consistent
methodological subjectivism, versus a mixture of Ricardian and post-Rlcardian
("classical and neoclassical") thinking,®^
The differences between the Austrlans and the modern neoclasslcals do
not end here, thou^ we now get into contemporary theoretical Issues on which
Austrlans are by no means agreed. But Professor Lachmann has recently argued
that expectations are equally subjective, and should be treated as such. He
sees such a procedure, most closely associated with G. L. S. Shackle, as being
85in the tradition of Menger, Mises and Hayek. On this procedure. Arrow, too,
has recently commented:
A trimcated theory of temporary equilibrium in which markets for
future goods are replaced by some form of expectations, themselves
functions of current prices and quantities, has indeed been
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developed, though Its empirical content Is necessarily meager If
the formation of e3q)ectatlons is left unanalyzed. But the true
neoclassical spirit is being denied in such a model.®"
Concludihg Remarks
The point has, I think, been made. The Austrians have been and remain "a
87school apart," precisely because of their consistent stress on subjective
value, and their consistent methodological subjectivism. Their views have
only been partially assimulated into the current economic orthodoxy. This is
precisely because modern economics has developed from only one of the original
neoclassical schools, the Lausanne. Moreover, modem economics has absorbed
a number of features of classical political econon^, elements to which all the
neoclassical shcools were hostile. There is a real question of the extent to
which modem economics is neoclassical or marginalist, in the sense that 19th
century' economists were. Least of all is modern economics Austrian.whether
one approves of this, of course, is primarily dependent on one's attitude
toward the approach of the Austrians since Menger, and of the substantive
content of their theories. But more and more, contemporary economists are
considering problems long the domain of Austrian economics, and on which
Austrian economists haVe written a greal deal: uncertainty, expectations,
economic fluctuations and information theory. Yet modern economics, even as it
has tumed to these problems, has generally failed to appreciate many of the
88characteristic Austrian insights. This is surely due in part to having become
convinced that whatever the Austrian School has contributed has been absorbed.
In part, this view stems from originally conceiving of the early marginalists
as homogeneous.
Independent discovery is an inefficient procedure. Economists can,
therefore, gain from acquainting themselves with the work of their predecessors.
Of course, one must be convinced that one's predecessors have something to say
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on a given subject. For too long now the orthodox view of the Marginal
Revolution has led economists to believe that they have nothing to learn from
reading Menger, because his was simply an ii^erfect, early formulation of modem
economics. Nothing could be further from the truth. I hope this paper has at
least stimulated some, to read or reread Menger, and to discover this for
themselves.
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